Navigating Chaos: American Policy Responses to the 1993 Russian Constitutional Crisis and its Impact on NATO Expansion

Often, researching historical questions can provide highly relevant insight into current international affairs. The Russian-Ukraine War is a prime example. The study of German Reunification and the agreements and statements among the stakeholders at the time can shed light on how the world arrived at a war in Ukraine more than three decades after German Reunification and the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This post introduces this research topic and outlines the research methodology to be used to answer questions about this transformative period in both American and Russian history.

German Reunification and NATO Expansion

On February 9, 1990, in a meeting at the Kremlin in the presence of Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, Secretary of State James Baker discussed NATO in connection with proposed German Reunification with General Secretary Gorbachev. During this discussion Secretary Baker remarked that it was his understanding that the Soviet position regarding NATO was that “if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” General Secretary Gorbachev and Secretary Baker agreed that, if they worked within the already established framework, they could achieve a “guarantee that Germany’s unification will not lead to NATO’s military organization spreading to the east.” On September 12, 1990, German Reunification occurred with the execution of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in Moscow (“Reunification Treaty”). Ultimately, the mutual settlement proposal regarding NATO expansion one inch to the east was not included in the text of the Reunification Treaty, and in the intervening years after German Reunification, the debate about NATO expansion continued in the government of the United States.

 A few years later after Gorbachev was gone with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and during almost all of 1993, the Russian government was embroiled in a struggle between the Supreme Soviet and President Boris Yeltsin over the rightful holder of power according to the Soviet Constitution. The legislative branch asserted control over Yeltsin’s objection, and on October 4, 1993, Yeltsin resolved the dispute, not by an election or a vote of the people but rather, by rolling in tanks of the Russian Taman Division and shelling the Russian White House which housed the Supreme Soviet. After the bloodshed, Yeltsin caused the arrest of the leaders, Alexander Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov. Then, only two weeks later on October 18, 1993, at a meeting with cabinet members, President Clinton for the first time decided to begin pushing NATO expansion by way of the Partnership for Peace. In March 1999, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary which joined NATO.

Questions Arise about How the 1993 Russian Constitutional Crisis Affected American Foreign Policy

Given the timing being only two weeks after Yeltsin shelled the Russian White House, the question becomes whether, and to what extent did, the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis affect American policy towards NATO expansion. In particular, and in connection with the ideological historiography of the Cold War, a few questions are evident.

1.         While there was certainly a component of the decision-making process in the United States which was security based, to what extent was NATO expansion an ideological decision rather than a security decision after the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis?

2.         After the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, was the decision in 1993 to sell NATO expansion, in part, an extension of the Cold War ideological war between classical liberalism and totalitarianism?

3.         After the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, did the American government fear a reemergence of the Soviet communists or the rise of potentially fascist leaders to power in Russia thereby quashing Russia’s experiment in liberalism?

4.         What was the dynamic among President Clinton and his advisers related to the idea of NATO expansion and how did the individual players view the world?

5.         How did the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis effect the Clinton Doctrine on foreign policy and does the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis provide evidence of whether the Clinton Doctrine was a cohesive foreign policy or a chaotic foreign policy during a chaotic time?

Historical Significance

The record of conversations between General Secretary Gorbachev and Secretary Baker and the Reunification Treaty are highly relevant today as the United States is involved in a proxy war in Ukraine against Russia caused, in large part, by potential NATO expansion into Ukraine. These two conversations provide primary evidence in connection with part of the dispute between the West and Russia that exists today.

The present-day position of the United States’ government and NATO is that there was never any written agreement regarding NATO expansion to the east pointing to the text of the Reunification Treaty. At the same time, the position of the Russian government is that, while such agreement is not in writing, the spirit of the Reunification Treaty and the discussions related thereto included an understanding that NATO would not expand one inch to the east pointing to the conversations between General Secretary Gorbachev and Secretary Baker. The Russian government also cites the removal of the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963 a few months after the Cuban Missile crisis which were done so by secret agreement rather than by a treaty. In any event, a prohibition on NATO expansion did not make it into the final draft of the Reunification Treaty, but at least the sentiment was there according to the Russians and to Vladimir Putin. Research in this field can help explain how the United States and Russia ended up at war in Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and three decades after the 1993 events.

Comparisons could be drawn between the history of the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis and subsequent NATO Expansion with the Treaty of Versailles which ended World War I and is often considered part of the reason Germany was demoralized and embraced Nazism as an alternative ideology leading to World War II. The history of the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis and subsequent NATO Expansion can shed insight on how conflict is terminated and the importance of measured foreign policy decisions during the inevitable international and national chaos as long-standing ideological systems crumble.

In addition, the history of the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis and subsequent NATO expansion is a small part of the history of what can happen when totalitarian regimes fail. For instance, research in this area is important, because it can provide understanding of how governments transition after the overthrow of totalitarian regimes such as after the French Revolution, after the conquering of a totalitarian regime as with the defeat of fascist Nazi Germany by the Allies, or after the failure of ideology and collapse of the totalitarian regime such the failure of the Soviet Union and its supporting communist ideology.

Research Plan and Methodology

In order to answer these questions, primary source archives for the Department of State and various intelligence agencies in Washington, D.C. as well as the Federal Archival Agency of the Russian Federation will be utilized. Starting with primary source documents, the facts related to the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis and subsequent NATO expansion will be established.

Following establishment of the facts, research of secondary sources is necessary in order to determine whether the facts used by each historian in his analysis are substantially similar and to determine how each historian interpreted these common facts. In addition, discussion of the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis and subsequent NATO expansion from the perspective of ideology rather than from an economic or social perspective can be instructive. The intent is to determine how much political and philosophical ideology played a role in NATO expansion and the subsequent Russian-Ukraine war.