The Origins of WWI
American soldier in fighting equipment
On June 28, 1914, the presumptive heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo by Serbian nationalist revolutionary, Gavrilo Princip. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, while obviously significant to Austro-Hungarian and Serbian relations, became the spark that started the First World War (“WWI”). At first glance, the question quickly becomes how did the assassination of an archduke from Austria by a Serbian nationalist snowball into a war which engulfed nearly the entire planet and result in the death of approximately 20 million people? The answer to such question is complicated but can be narrowed down to one key factor. Beginning in the mid-19th century, aggressive German military expansion and aggressive, ill-conceived foreign policy created tension and fear among the neighboring European nations. As a result of the personalities of the leaders of these nations and the entangled military and economic alliances among the same countries, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand became the first domino in a series of events which culminated in “the war to end all wars.”
When analyzing the deeper origins of WWI, Germany is key. Prior to 1871, Germany was not a unified country but an amalgamation of the independent states of Austria, Bavaria, Prussia, and others. The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) effectively ended the rule of the Holy Roman Empire, decimated the German states in the process, and resulted in the death of nearly one-quarter of the German population and nearly half of the population between southwest Germany and northern Poland. As posited by C.V. Wedgewood, an English historian in the early to mid-20th century, The Thirty Years’ War was not a German civil war, but a war between France and the Hapsburgs fought in Central Europe which devastated the German people. Following The Thirty Years’ War, the German states also endured the Napoleonic Wars and Otto von Bismarck’s War for unification. Not until 1871 and after victories under the direction of Bismarck, the German chancellor, was Germany unified as the Second Reich.
According to Fritz Fischer, who was a German historian famous of his analysis of German goals during WWI, the newly unified Second Reich was a partnership between the German state and the Prussian military. Pursuant to Fischer’s theories, this partnership was designed to secure Germany’s future and “hinged on a world policy dedicated to securing Germany a place in the sun no matter what the cost.” For hundreds of years prior to German unification and throughout the period before WWI, it was the general feeling in Germany that “Germany had been surrounded by stronger powers intent on its partition and destruction or, at the very least, keeping it weak and divided.” As such, German talk of war during the period from 1871 until the rise of Wilhelm II was less about victory but “more of confronting the twin threats of defeat and annihilation.” Germany’s leaders at the time set the country on a course of military expansion in order to protect Germany from the stronger powers surrounding it.
On this historical background and after the deaths in 1888 of Wilhelm I and Frederick II who both supported classical liberal philosophy of civil liberties under the rule of law and economic freedoms, Kaiser Wilhelm II reigned over Germany until his abdication in 1918. Unlike his father Wilhelm I, the reign of Wilhelm II was marked by his extreme authoritarianism and a “personality bordering on the insane.” The personality of Wilhelm II included wild, theatrical speeches which were often times “completely out of touch with reality,” an “inclination to take everything personally,” and a general inability to distinguish between “personal and public affairs” and “rhetoric versus reality.” By many of these indications, it can be seriously argued that, though it has not been proven, Wilhelm II suffered from mental illness.
During his reign and abandoning the classical liberal philosophies of Wilhelm I, Wilhelm II embarked on a policy known as Weltpolitik or world politics in an effort to advance German interests worldwide in an effort to dominate. Valentine Chirol, a British journalist at the turn of the 20th century, stated “It was the whole evolution of German policy since [Wilhelm II’s] accession which has led, and was fatally bound to lead, to the present catastrophe, by concentrating the whole material and intellectual energies of the German nation on the pursuit of world dominion based upon force alone.” Wilhelm II’s goal of his Weltpolitik policy was to build Germany into a world power both economically and militarily. The origin of Weltpolitik seems to be in a speech by an ally of Wilhelm II named Berhard von Bülow before the Reichstag in December of 1899. Bülow argued before the Reichstag for the superiority of their race over others in Europe and in the third world. Bülow argued that the German people must rise up as a nation and challenge both Britain and France and other European nations elsewise they would become the anvil in history. Bülow argued that, through colonial expansionism, the German people could secure their power in Germany during this time. Germany needed colonies in order to secure markets for their goods and to obtain raw materials required during industrialization and militarization. In particular, Bülow argued that without colonial expansionism, Germany could not succeed in Europe as a power.
That said, critics of Wilhelm II and Bülow argue that Weltpolitik as conducted by the two lacked a long-term strategy and clear objectives. Further these same critics assert that Weltpolitik was not concerned with territorial expansion per se but with international prestige and creating a heightened nationalism in the populous. In addition and prior to the establishment of the policy of Weltpolitik, Germany’s international goals both diplomatically and militarily were to prevent a two-front war on both the eastern and western edges of the German Empire. Under Weltpolitik and as evidenced by the Schlieffen Plan which was created in order to ensure the victory in a two-front war, Wilhelm II actually believed that German forces could rapidly overwhelm French forces in the west and then shift German forces to the east to meet and defeat the Russians prior to any effective Russian mobilization.
In order to prepare for and counter this German militarism and expansionism, the nations in Europe began to form ever more complicated alliances among each other. Most scholars seem to focus more on western Europe and the relations between Germany and its neighbors in studies of the cause of the war. While such concentration on Germany’s role is important, such focus tends to trivialize the role of the events in the Balkans preceding the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. In 1873 and in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia entered into the “The Three Emperors League.” In less than a decade, the interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia diverged thus making it impossible for Austria-Hungary and Russia to remain allied. In 1882, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy formed the “Triple Alliance” which was a mutual defense treaty that provided the Second Reich a layer of protection from France.
In 1885, Nicholas II of Russia, who was narrow minded, weak, and “deficient in perspective,” refused to sanction the Bulgarian unification and resulted in Bulgaria aligning itself with the Austrian-Hungarians and leaving the Russian sphere of influence. Such development left Russia with virtually no allies in the Balkans with the exception of Serbia. In 1887, the Russians and the Germans entered into the Reinsurance Treaty which was a secret treaty by which each country promised to stay neutral in the event that France or Austria-Hungary attacked either country. By 1890, Germany severed its connection to Russia and even closed the Berlin financial markets to Russia thereby depriving Russia of much needed foreign financing which Russia was using to invest in economic development. While Germany refused to allow Russian participation in the Berlin financial markets, the French were ready to invest in the Russian economy and soon thereafter the two countries agreed to military support as well. In 1894, the French and the Russians enter into a military convention by which (1) if France was attacked by Germany (or Italy with German support), Russia would enter the conflict on the side of France and use all available forces; (2) if Russia was attacked by Germany (or Austria-Hungary with German support), France would enter the conflict on the side of Russia and use all available forces. All the while, England attempted to maintain neutrality. By the turn of the 20th century, the stage was set and the sides established. Now, it was just a waiting game for the powder keg to be lit, and on June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip provided the spark by assassinating Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
After the assassination and on July 6, 1914 and with a telegram from Germany to Austria, the Germans declared its unconditional support to Austria no matter how the Austrians decided to respond. On July 23, 1914 and seemingly desiring war, Austria delivered an ultimatum to Serbia which Austria knew would be unacceptable to the Serbians. Such ultimatum required the Serbian government to crack down on the Serbian and nationalists but, more significantly and infringing on Serbian sovereignty in an apparent power grab, required the Serbians to allow Austrian officials to be involved in the investigation and punishment in Serbia.
Shortly thereafter, the predetermined alliances began to operate like clockwork. Nicholas II of Russia supported Serbia in order to avoid another catastrophic defeat in the Balkans, Germany reinforced Austria-Hungary, and the French supported Russia. On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, on August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia, and on August 3, 1914, Germany declared war on France.
As a result of Wilhelm’s hyper-aggressive policy positions under Weltpolitik and the alliances created to curb the regional hegemony of the Second Reich, the war to end all wars began. Within a couple months and to the detriment of the Second Reich, the Schlieffen Plan, supra, proved to be a complete failure and resulted in a trench warfare stalemate in western Europe for four years and in the deaths of tens of millions of souls without any long-term strategic advantage being obtained by any warring party. For Christians and as believers in the loving message of Christ, it can sometimes be difficult to imagine such carnage with or without some noble (or otherwise) objective being achieved. Wilhelm II was horribly raised and endured “rather disdainful treatment, devoid of any emotional attachment” from his mother. Perhaps a more selfless, Christian environment during Wilhelm II’s childhood would have altered the course of human events.
In addition, the most important principles in addressing WWI in Christian principles, are the ideas advocated by Christ of loving one’s neighbor and loving your enemy. Such principles, in their purest form, precludes conflict. Indeed, the industrialized killing of millions of people which followed the assassination of Ferdinand is quite contrary to these most fundamental teachings of Christ. These are not the actions of a loving society but of a dark society that is bent on hate and control by force. The hatred of others which resulted in tens of millions of deaths during the Great War caused widespread pain and suffering among the German people, and Europe as well, for the next thirty years. In order to avoid this type of mass, global carnage in the future, perhaps our leaders should first turn to Christ as opposed to large-scale killing.
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